VPN in China, Iran and Russia: what is blocked and what works
VPN in China, Iran and Russia in 2026: OpenVPN and WireGuard are blocked, VLESS Reality and XHTTP hold, shutdowns and whitelists are the new threat.
In China, Iran and Russia, classic VPN protocols barely work. Filters recognise OpenVPN, plain WireGuard and early versions of Shadowsocks by the shape of their traffic, without decrypting anything. What survives are protocols that pass themselves off as an ordinary website visit: VLESS with Reality camouflage and the XHTTP transport from the Xray project. Where the network does not cut the traffic used by calls and games, AmneziaWG also works. The main threat has shifted, though: Iran and Russia increasingly switch off mobile internet entirely or leave only a whitelist of sites, and no protocol helps against that.
Below is the history of how three countries learned to catch VPNs, what censorship researchers have confirmed, and a short snapshot of one VPN service’s data for the past week.
How VPNs used to work and why they stopped
Until the mid-2010s, a VPN was simply an encrypted tunnel. The most popular option, OpenVPN, hid the content well but did not hide itself. Its connections have a recognisable opening and a distinctive packet pattern. The filter does not need to read the data: it is enough to recognise OpenVPN and drop the connection.
WireGuard, which entered the Linux kernel in March 2020, turned out faster and simpler. From a censor’s point of view it is just as visible: a short handshake at the start of the connection that always looks the same. It started being blocked almost as soon as it went mainstream.
Shadowsocks appeared in China in 2012. Its author, known as clowwindy, designed it as traffic without features: a stream that looks like random noise. In August 2015 he deleted the code from GitHub, writing that the police had asked him to stop. Other developers carried the project on, and for several years it remained the main circumvention tool in China.
The lesson is simple. Encryption does not save you if the shape of the traffic gives the VPN away. And traffic that looks like nothing at all eventually became a feature of its own.
How China learned to recognise VPNs
The Great Firewall has been built since the early 2000s and is considered the most advanced filtering system in the world. Key milestones of recent years:
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| 2017 | Authorities required licences for VPN services. In July Apple removed VPN apps from the Chinese App Store |
| November 2021 | The firewall began blocking fully encrypted traffic, meaning Shadowsocks and similar protocols |
| October 2022 | Mass blocking of servers running over TLS: Trojan and Xray with plain TLS |
| August 2025 | For a little over an hour, the firewall dropped connections to port 443, the main port for secure websites |
The second row was examined in detail by researchers from GFW Report together with university teams. Their paper appeared at USENIX Security in 2023. It showed that the firewall looks at the first bytes of a connection: if they look too much like random data, the connection is suspect. Ordinary websites do not start that way, so featureless traffic betrayed itself. By the authors’ estimate, the check also caught a slice of ordinary traffic, about 0.6%, and China accepted that cost.
The August 2025 incident, described by GFW Report, showed something else: China is willing to break a large chunk of the normal internet for a short time. It is rare, but the firewall has that tool.
What Iran blocks and how it shuts the internet down
Iran acts more crudely than China, but more broadly. Filtering is combined with shutdowns, and the foundation is the National Information Network: a domestic layer where banks, government services and local apps keep running even without a link to the outside world.
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| November 2019 | Near-total internet shutdown for about a week during fuel price protests |
| September 2022 | After the death of Mahsa Amini, Instagram and WhatsApp were blocked, mobile internet was cut in the evenings in some regions |
| December 2024 | Authorities lifted the ban on WhatsApp and Google Play |
| June 2025 | During the war with Israel, the external internet was almost completely shut down, NetBlocks recorded connectivity falling to a few percent of normal |
For VPNs this means two different modes. On ordinary days, filtering runs: known protocols are cut, and servers that fall under suspicion are blocked by address. In a crisis, the switch is pulled: the outside world disappears while the domestic network keeps working. In the second mode, the question of which protocol is better loses its meaning.
Iran is also known for filtering that varies a lot from provider to provider and between mobile and home networks. The same app can work on one operator and fail on the next.
How Russia blocks VPNs
Russia came to protocol blocking later than the others but moved fast. The main tool is TSPU equipment, which under the sovereign internet law sits at operators and is controlled by Roskomnadzor.
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| November 2017 | A law took effect banning VPN services from providing access to blocked sites |
| March 2022 | Facebook and Instagram were blocked |
| 2023 | OpenVPN and WireGuard stopped working en masse on mobile operators, according to numerous user reports |
| March 2024 | VPN advertising was banned |
| Summer 2024 | YouTube throttling began |
| May 2025 | Regular mobile internet shutdowns began in regions |
| August 2025 | Calls in WhatsApp and Telegram were restricted |
| September 2025 | Fines for deliberately searching for extremist materials appeared. The Ministry of Digital Development launched whitelists of sites available during shutdowns |
The last two rows matter most. Authorities justify mobile shutdowns as protection against drones, and in a number of regions they have become routine. A whitelist means that during a shutdown only approved services work: government services, banks, marketplaces, large domestic sites. Any VPN server outside the list is unreachable at that moment.
Why VLESS Reality and XHTTP hold up
Both came out of the Xray project, led by a developer known as RPRX. They share one idea: do not look like a VPN, look like the ordinary internet.
Reality came out in early 2023. A connection to the VPN server looks like a visit to a real large website. If the filter decides to check and contacts the server itself, the real website answers. To block such a server for sure, the censor has to either cut off a popular site or live with mistakes.
XHTTP appeared in late 2024. Data travels as ordinary web requests, as if a browser were loading pages and files. Such traffic can be routed through a content delivery network, and then blocking the VPN means blocking part of ordinary websites.
AmneziaWG was built by the Amnezia team. It is WireGuard with the recognisable handshake traits removed. The disguise works, but the protocol rides the same type of traffic as calls and online games. If the network cuts that type of traffic to foreign servers entirely, no disguise helps.
The overall picture from researchers’ open reports and user accounts looks like this (estimate as of November 2026):
| Protocol | China | Iran | Russia |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenVPN | blocked | blocked | blocked on mobile |
| WireGuard | blocked | blocked | blocked |
| Older Shadowsocks | blocked | unstable | unstable |
| AmneziaWG | depends on network | depends on network | mostly works |
| VLESS Reality | works | works | works, cut in places |
| XHTTP | works | works | works |
Works here does not mean guaranteed. Individual servers get blocked by address, especially when many users share one address. A protocol lives longer than any specific server.
What one VPN service’s data shows for the week
Open statistics by protocol are rarely published: VPN services keep them to themselves. HopFox VPN shared aggregates for 27 October to 2 November 2026: the share of successful connection attempts by the country of the user’s network and by protocol. This is one network of one service, not the whole country, so the figures are best read as one snapshot alongside researchers’ reports.
| Country | Reality | XHTTP | AmneziaWG |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 92% | 91% | 34% |
| Iran | 75% | 66% | 34% |
| Russia | 59% | 71% | 63% |
| Germany, for comparison | 78% | 71% | 39% |
Germany is in the table for a reason. Even where nobody blocks VPNs, some connections fail because of a weak network, phone settings or server glitches. So the comparison should be with an uncensored country, not with 100%.
What the snapshot shows:
- China. Reality and XHTTP got through 9 times out of 10, better than Germany. AmneziaWG got through only one time in three.
- Iran. Reality and XHTTP slipped over the week. But figures in Germany slipped almost the same way in the same week, so this data does not allow the drop to be attributed to new moves by Iranian censors. There is also a caveat: in Iran the service starts with XHTTP by default, so it more often takes the first attempt on a bad network.
- Russia. XHTTP performed the same as in Germany. Reality lagged noticeably. AmneziaWG gets through more often in Russia than in China and Iran.
One Iranian detail stands out: 2,165 times during the week, not a single server of the service answered from the user’s network. That is what a network looks like when it lets no connections through to any foreign address. It matches the description of Iranian shutdowns above, but the data does not show the exact cause.
Two more caveats. After a failure, the app switches to another protocol on its own, so the percentages show the success of a specific protocol, not the share of people whose VPN eventually worked. And the Russian sample is small, from 319 to 1,647 attempts per protocol.
What no protocol can beat
The whole cat-and-mouse story with protocols is about filtering: the censor tries to spot a VPN in the stream and cut it without breaking the rest of the internet. Reality and XHTTP win exactly this game, because they are hard to tell apart from ordinary websites.
A shutdown works differently. When the external internet is switched off entirely, as Iran did in November 2019 and June 2025, or only a whitelist is left, as in Russian regions since autumn 2025, there is no longer any need to tell VPNs from websites. Everything not allowed is unavailable. In those hours, only satellite links, foreign operators’ roaming near borders and services on the whitelist itself still work.
So the question of which protocol works splits in two in 2026. On an ordinary day the answer is known: Reality and XHTTP, and AmneziaWG on part of the networks. On a shutdown day the answer depends not on the protocol but on whether a person has any path to the external internet at all.
Changes can be tracked through open sources: GFW Report publishes research on the Chinese firewall, OONI collects blocking measurements by country, NetBlocks records internet shutdowns in real time.